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Recap; Freedom from Religion Foundation v: Weber: Big Mountain
Jesus and the Constitution
Constance Van Kley
No. 13-35770 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Oral Argument: Tuesday, July 7, 2015, in Pioneer Courtroom, 2nd Floor,
Portland, Oregon. Heard by Judges Harry Pregerson, N. Randy Smith,
and John Byron Owens.
I. RICH BOLTON FOR APPELLANT FREEDOM FROM RELIGION
FOUNDATION
Mr. Bolton presented his argument defensively and without a
clear structure. The Judges, particularly Judge Smith, vigorously
questioned him. Their questions primarily focused on establishing
whether a factual dispute exists and determining FFRF’s legal arguments
on both standing and the constitutional issues presented.
Mr. Bolton opened by reminding the Court that Big Mountain
Jesus has historically been considered a religious shrine. The Knights of
Columbus (“KOC”), not the United States Forest Service (“USFS”),
owns the statue. The Appellant’s position is that USFS violated the
Establishment Clause by issuing a permit reauthorizing the placement of
the KOC-owned Jesus statue on USFS land. The Freedom from Religion
Foundation (“FFRF”) does not dispute that USFS followed current
regulations in reissuing the permit. Rather, it asserts that USFS showed
prejudice in the permit renewal process and that the result of
reissuance—the continued existence of the statue on government land—
violates the Establishment Clause.
In response to Judge Smith’s questions, Mr. Bolton moved to
FFRF’s standing to sue under the Establishment Clause. FFRF bases
standing on member Pamela Morris, who saw the statue in 1957 and has
since avoided the area. Judge Smith questioned why Ms. Morris would
need to avoid the statue when the record suggests that she would
encounter it only if she were specifically looking for it. Mr. Bolton
presented two arguments: first, that Ms. Morris’s declaration of
avoidance is sufficient; and second, that some facts in the record suggest
that the statue is actually “readily viewable.” As an alternative basis for
standing, Mr. Bolton pointed to William Cox, who encounters the statue
several times each year. In response to Judge Smith, who suggested that
Mr. Cox’s dislike of the statue did not suggest religious injury, Mr.
Bolton argued that any unwanted exposure to displays of religious
endorsement on state property does in fact give standing. Although Mr.
Cox did not become an FFRF member until after initiation of the lawsuit,
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Mr. Bolton asserted that he may rightfully be considered a member for
the purpose of standing.
Mr. Bolton moved then to the merits of the case, framing the
issue as whether permit reissuance violates the Establishment Clause.
Mr. Bolton advocated for application of the standard articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 which prohibits the government’s endorsement of
religion. Because the exception to Lemon set forth in Van Orden v.
Perry2 is properly applied only in a museum-like context, it does not
apply here, as the Jesus statue is the only monument on Big Mountain.
The ultimate question, then, is whether the statue is a government
endorsement of religious speech.
Judge Smith asked Mr. Bolton to distinguish Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,3 a Free Speech Clause case that
authorizes governmental entities to neutrally allow private speech in a
public forum. Mr. Bolton argued that Capitol Square did not deal with a
permanent monument, and USFS lands were never designated as a forum
for discourse. Even if the forest were a limited public forum, permanent
religious monuments such as the Jesus statue are unconstitutional.
Although the current permit will expire, the statue may be considered a
permanent monument because the current regulations present no obstacle
to reissuance. Mr. Bolton argued that the point is moot regardless: the
Establishment Clause takes precedence over the Free Speech Clause in a
limited public forum analysis.
To close, Mr. Bolton returned to the issue as originally stated:
does the statue give the appearance of government endorsement?
Because questions of fact remain on this issue, summary judgment was
inappropriate. The statue’s original classification as a religious shrine
may show religious endorsement. Additionally, the government initially
denied reauthorization and reissued the permit only in response to public
outcry, suggesting that the renewal was a product of a process
susceptible to religious favoritism. For legal support, Mr. Bolton pointed
to Trunk v. City of San Diego,4 in which the Ninth Circuit found that a
stand-alone cross gave the appearance of religious endorsement even
though it was recognized and commissioned as a war memorial. The
incongruous nature of the Jesus statue in picturesque surroundings
similarly gives rise to contemplation, enhancing the appearance of
religious endorsement.
400 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Under Lemon, an inquiry into a potential violation of the Establishment
Clause considers purpose, effect, and whether the government action fosters “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”
2
125 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J. concurring). In his concurrence Justice Breyer suggests
applying three primary considerations in difficult Establishment Clause cases: use, setting, and
history.
3
515 U.S. 753 (1995).
4
629 F.3d 1099.
1
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II. JOAN PEPIN FOR APPELLEE UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE
To structure her argument, Ms. Pepin applied both the Lemon
test and the Van Orden exception to show that the USFS’s authorization
of the statue was constitutional by any standard. The Judges asked few
legal questions of Ms. Pepin, focusing primarily on whether a material
factual issue remained. The Court seemed to closely follow her legal
argument, which was well-organized and cohesive.
Ms. Pepin argued that under the Lemon test, the government
must only show that it is motivated in part by a secular purpose. The
government had two secular purposes supporting permit reissuance: first,
the statue had local historical significance; and second, USFS did its duty
in following regulations.
Ms. Pepin disputed FFRF’s argument that USFS created a
secular purpose in an attempt to hide the statue’s clear religious purpose.
Big Mountain Jesus is a religious symbol, but it has secular value as a
beloved, quirky, and relatively rare reminder of the area’s early
development. Ms. Pepin argued that FFRF can present no facts
discrediting the statue’s historical significance but only speculate that
reissuance of the permit is a sham.
Ms. Pepin turned to whether the statue gives the effect of
religious endorsement. The test for endorsement is applied not to the
statue itself, which is KOC’s private speech, but to the government’s
action in reissuing the permit. Under Capitol Square, FFRF must show
the government discriminated in favor of private religious expression or
activity.5 Here, there is no support for a finding that USFS discriminated
in favor of religious users when USFS appropriately followed neutral
regulations.
Endorsement is a legal rather than a factual determination. As
the plaintiff and appellant, FFRF bears the burden of showing
discrimination. Ms. Pepin argued that summary judgment was
appropriate because the facts as stated by FFRF cannot lead to a
reasonable inference in favor of endorsement. Ms. Pepin systematically
discredited FFRF’s interpretation of the record, using the facts to show
that USFS simply followed neutral regulations in reissuing the permit,
treating KOC as it would any other applicant.
Finally, Ms. Pepin analyzed the statue under the Van Orden
exception to the Lemon test. Under Van Orden, a court considers use,
setting, and history. Here, the use is somewhat mixed but primarily
secular: Big Mountain Jesus is “usually wearing a ski helmet,” and skiers
find the statue a convenient and quirky meeting-place. The setting, too, is
secular: Big Mountain is a commercial ski area; nothing encourages
worship or devotion. Finally, the history suggests religious neutrality, as
5

Capital Square, 515 U.S. at 764.
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the statue stood for fifty-seven years before its first challenge, when the
Appellant first sent letters to USFS and filed FOIA requests.
III. ERIC BAXTER FOR APPELLEE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS
Mr. Baxter’s argument centered on distinguishing and
analogizing a range of Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases. Mr.
Baxter framed the test of the Establishment Clause differently than either
other party: to prevail, a person must have felt excluded on the grounds
of religious belief.
His argument focused not on the Establishment Clause, however,
but on the Free Speech Clause, which had not factored into the District
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. If the Free Speech Clause
authorizes the statue, KOC might not merely survive this challenge but
enjoy considerable protection from future constitutional challenges. The
Judges’ questions for Mr. Baxter were designed to further clarify
precedent and to establish that a factual issue did not exist.
Mr. Baxter opened by expanding on the statue’s context. Big
Mountain Jesus can be viewed only by travelling to a commercial ski
resort, paying to ski, riding a lift to the top of the mountain, choosing one
particular run on the very edge of the resort, and then looking to the left
through a stand of trees at the right moment. A skier who stops will find
a sign commemorating the lives of fallen WWII soldiers and designating
the Knights of Columbus as the statue’s owner.
Mr. Baxter looked to Christian Science Reading Room Jointly
Maintained v. City and County of San Francisco,6 where the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed a potential Establishment Clause
violation within the context of a commercial airport. In a commercial
context, the government likely does not endorse religion by allowing
private religious speech. The statue’s presence on Big Mountain creates
the assumption that it belongs to the resort, not the government.
Mr. Baxter expanded the discussion of private speech in a public
forum, which is expressly allowed under the Free Speech Clause. The
entirety of the National Forest is a public forum; KOC’s speech is private
speech; and to target that speech contrary to regulations would be to
discriminate against that private speech in violation of the Free Speech
Clause. Mr. Baxter distinguished Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.
Summum,7 where the Supreme Court analyzed a permanent governmentowned monument in a public forum under the Establishment rather than
the Free Speech clause. Because Big Mountain Jesus is privately owned,
the proper analysis proceeds under the Free Speech Clause.

6
7

784 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1986).
555 U.S. 460 (2009
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Mr. Baxter distinguished Trunk, upon which FFRF relies
heavily. Trunk involved a 43-foot-tall cross, viewable from the interstate,
with a strong history of religious use. Mr. Baxter suggested that the facts
in Trunk were extreme, characterizing Trunk as the exception to the
general rule that monuments stand. Mr. Baxter closed by reinforcing
KOC’s argument that revoking the permit would constitute
unconstitutional discrimination.
IV. BOLTON’S REBUTTAL
Although Mr. Bolton had already exceeded his time limit, the
Court allowed time for rebuttal. Mr. Bolton attempted to redraw the
issue: the proper question is whether the statue gives the appearance of
religious endorsement, not—as the government argues—whether
authorization of the statue gives evidence of discrimination. Regardless
of how the issue is framed, however, facts on record support FFRF’s
position. Mr. Bolton argued that summary judgment was inappropriate
because factual disputes prevent a finding on critical issues.
V. PREDICTION
Framing the issues may prove more difficult than reaching a
holding. Each party presented a different standard for determining
whether the Establishment Clause is violated by the permit’s reissuance.
FFRF argued that the standard is whether the statue’s presence on
government land gives the appearance of government endorsement of
religion. USFS argued both that analysis should proceed under Lemon
and/or Van Orden and that FFRF must prove not only the appearance of
endorsement but actual government discrimination. KOC suggested that
the proper standard is a person’s sense of exclusion based on religious
beliefs. Further, KOC brought an additional constitutional issue: whether
revoking the permit would violate the Free Speech Clause by
discriminating against KOC’s private speech.
It is unlikely that remanding for further proceedings would
clarify legal issues: FFRF did not point to specific facts suggesting a
material factual dispute, and USFS rightly characterized FFRF’s attempt
to do so as speculative. The Court will likely find that the only remaining
questions are questions of law.
Mr. Baxter presented the free speech issue well, but the Court
will likely find that the primary inquiry proceeds under the Establishment
Clause. The action complained of, the government’s reissuing a permit,
is an act of government and not private speech. The Court will only need
to reach the free speech issue if it finds that the Establishment Clause
was violated and that FFRF lacked standing to bring the claim.
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The Court may find that FFRF lacked standing to sue. FFRF
cited to the facts on record to support its argument for standing, but it did
not present a cohesive legal argument on this point. The Court’s decision
to question the Appellant but neither of the Appellees on standing
suggests that it had already reached a decision on the issue. If the Court
decides FFRF lacks standing, it need not consider whether the District
Court correctly analyzed the Establishment Clause issue, but it may
choose to do so to provide clarification and prevent later reversal.
If the Court reaches the Establishment Clause issue, the Appellee
USFS presented the likeliest framework for the Court’s decision. USFS’s
argument is consistent with the District Court’s analysis, and it is simple,
cohesive, and supported by United States Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit precedent. Even if the Court adopts the Appellant’s strict
standard for analysis under the Establishment Clause, however, it will
likely affirm summary judgment, finding that the context of the statue
prevents the appearance of government endorsement. The Court will
likely affirm summary judgment on either the basis of standing or lack of
violation of the Establishment Clause.

